Bassel Sabri: Trump and Xi shook hands in Shenzhen. We saw that, and even sat down with Putin for unprecedented three-way talks. But there was no major trade breakthrough, and the current truce runs out on January 10th. With new chip restrictions and China’s grip on rare earths still on the table, all eyes now turn to the G20 in Miami.
So what did Shenzhen really deliver, and what does it mean for markets? Joining me right now is Matt Gertken, chief geopolitical strategist at BCA Research. Matt, welcome back to Global Markets.
Matt Gertken: Hi, Bassel. Thanks for having me on.
Bassel Sabri: So Trump and Xi appeared eager to demonstrate strong relations in Shenzhen, but there was no major trade breakthrough. What did this meeting actually achieve, in your opinion?
Matt Gertken: Well, I think it showed that the United States is willing to talk to different countries. These are autocratic regimes that are engaged in effectively proxy wars with the United States, in Ukraine and Iran and potentially someday in Taiwan. And so to have the discussion is to signal that there is some degree of global coordination that’s possible among the nuclear superpowers, and that’s at least marginally positive for global stability.
Bassel Sabri: And with Trump facing a changed political landscape, actually, after the US midterms, who do you think now has the stronger negotiating position, Washington or Beijing?
Matt Gertken: Well, it’s an issue of time frame. In the short term, the United States is weakened by the fact that the president does not have very much domestic support. Only about a third of people support the war in Iran, and he’s now suffered a wallop in the Senate and the House, and he’s going to be gone in two years because of term limits. So this does reduce his leverage. But on the other hand, the United States, because it has elections, can have course correction in its national policies every few years. And that ultimately is beneficial for the society and the economy.
Whereas with Russia and China, they have an advantage right now. They don’t have this domestic weakness or this domestic popular opinion that they have to respond to. But over time, that can lead to path dependency and a continuation or accumulation of policies that distort their economies and their societies.
Bassel Sabri: Right. So let’s factor in time here, because that is of the essence. The current trade truce expires on January 10th. So how confident are you that Trump and Xi can actually reach an extension at the G20 in Miami? And what could actually prevent an agreement?
Matt Gertken: I’m not very confident that they can extend the trade truce in the short term. They probably will over the two-year period. Xi Jinping has the 21st National Party Congress, which is an important rotation of the elite in the Communist Party, next fall. And President Trump wants his Republican Party to have a bid for the presidency in the fall of 2028. And so it wouldn’t really make sense for either of these two leaders to directly sabotage each other’s economies in the lead-up to these important events. And if President Trump sabotages stability in China ahead of the party congress, then he certainly wouldn’t be wise to expect that China would be friendly and cooperative leading up to the US election.
So I think they will maintain an overall trade truce. But in the short term, there is no doubt that there is a flare-up related to tightening of export controls on semiconductors and technology, and also it is possible that tariffs could go up.
Bassel Sabri: All right. Since you just mentioned that, just ahead of the summit, Washington actually tightened restrictions on China’s access to advanced AI chips through overseas data centers. The question is, are technology restrictions now a bigger threat to US-China relations than tariffs?
Matt Gertken: Oh, absolutely, I think they are. First of all, if the tariffs go up, they won’t go up by all that much. Now, with China, this is an area where the president does have some popular support for tariffs, which is different than with Europe or Canada. And it’s also the case that the Supreme Court will probably accept the administration’s logic for tariffs on China, because China does have a lot of trade imbalances that it exports. So there is room to raise tariffs on China.
But it’s absolutely the case that the tech controls threaten to limit China’s productivity and innovation and its future economic growth through that mechanism, but also its future military and strategic capabilities. And this is a really dramatic technology race between the two superpowers, which are near competitors and will contend for the mastery of the Asia-Pacific region. And so I think it is the case that this is a much more severe threat to the relationship and to the trade truce.
Bassel Sabri: So, given that China also has this considerable leverage through its control of rare earth supplies, could we see another round of retaliation if negotiations fail to produce meaningful progress?
Matt Gertken: Yes, that’s exactly the case. The US will need to tighten the export controls, China will then retaliate, and we will have a flare-up in relations, because [unclear: “the National Security Agency’s thinking over the long term”] and both countries do want to make advances on self-sufficiency and restrictions on each other’s ability to maintain the cutting edge of AI and future technologies. So they will do that.
Now, the presidents themselves would probably want to temper some of these competitive urges and try to maintain overall stability. And that’s sort of what we saw in Shenzhen, with this gentleman’s agreement continuing. So it can sort of fail in the near term, but they may need to put it back together again and maintain overall stability for these important political events that they face over the coming two years. At some point, there probably will be a decisive break in the trade relationship and economic divorce, when the two sides feel sufficient enough in chips and rare earths to break apart. But I don’t think we’re there yet.
Bassel Sabri: And Matthew, you have earlier described the summit as marginally positive for global financial markets, particularly in terms of sentiment. But without concrete agreements, are investors becoming too optimistic about US-China relations? What do you think?
Matt Gertken: Well, I think in general, the market faces a very trying time right now, because you have temporary volatility from policy uncertainty due to the midterm election, you have some cracks forming in the AI rally, and you have the risk of the Fed becoming too hawkish. But the key here is, when we think about whether these wars will be expanding and whether new supply shocks will be stemming from expansion of war, that could be tempered by cooperation between the great powers. And so to see that cooperation should lift sentiment, at least marginally. But we do have to see follow-through to make sure that the wars do conclude in ceasefires, and we get a ceasefire dividend rather than having the risk of expansion of war.
Bassel Sabri: So the summit also brought Trump, Xi and Putin together for unprecedented talks. Could this broader diplomatic engagement produce geopolitical risks, particularly for oil and energy markets?
Matt Gertken: Well, you know, they had a four-point agreement. The second point was to expand global refined oil production, which would really mean that the US would tell Ukraine to stop attacking Russian refineries, and Russia and China would tell Iran to stop attacking regional refineries in the Middle East. And they also had an agreement to prevent nuclear proliferation, which would imply that Russia and China would tell Iran not to restart its nuclear program and pursue nuclear weapons.
If those things actually happen, then we are witnessing coordination between the superpowers, and we could have a drop in global gasoline and diesel prices, which would be beneficial for consumers and for the global economy. But we have to see whether they are going to be effective. And, you know, there are mixed incentives here, particularly between Russia and China, since Russia is an oil exporter.
Bassel Sabri: [unclear: “That we appreciate.”] Definitely, these are very valuable insights into the situation. Thank you very much for coming in today.
Matt Gertken: Absolutely, my pleasure. Thank you.